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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950466-CA 
v. : 
DENNIS D. BEDA : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant, Dennis D. Beda, appeals his conviction for 
witness tampering, a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1995)(R. 72). This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 
1995) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Has defendant established that he was denied his right 
to conflict-free counsel? This claim presents a question of 
law reviewed on the trial record because defendant raises it 
for the first time on direct appeal without a prior 
evidentiary hearing. State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 175 
(Utah App. 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
508 (1995), and rule 3.7, Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with witness tampering, a 
third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 76-8-508 
(1995) (R. 1). The jury convicted defendant of the charged 
crime (R. 26). The trial court sentenced defendant to the 
statutory prison term of zero-to-five years (R. 72). 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 75). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the course of an unspecified extended investigation, 
police went to defendant's residential hotel room on July 
26, 1994 (R. 168, 206-207). The officers discovered D.A., a 
sixteen-year-old boy, in the room (R. 106, 169) . D.A. told 
the officers that defendant had given him alcohol, and they 
arrested defendant for supplying alcohol to a minor (R. 170-
2 
71, 206-207). 
Prior to trial on the alcohol charge, defendant met 
with D.A. and prevailed on D.A. to change his statement to 
exonerate defendant (R. 119-22, 133, 178). Defendant told 
D.A. that, if D.A. did not recant, defendant would have to 
spend a year in prison; that defendant would pay any fine 
D.A. received as a result of changing his statement; and 
that he would pay for D.A.'s car insurance and license 
plates (R. 123, 129-30). 
After that conversation, defendant took D.A. to visit 
two attorneys to discuss the possible consequences to D.A. 
if he changed his story to exonerate defendant of providing 
him with alcohol (R. 124-26, 147, 191, 202-203). 
Ultimately, defendant took D.A. to Melissa Whetton, the 
Weber County Public Defender Association secretary, who 
typed a new statement recanting D.A.'s previous accusations 
(R. 212-13). 
On the morning of the trial for the alcohol charge, 
D.A. produced the written statement denying that defendant 
had provided him with alcohol (R. 176-77). Detective Miner 
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(one of the investigating police officers), D.A., and D.A.'s 
mother were all present when D.A. gave the written 
recantation to his trial counsel, Mr. John Caine, and 
verbally denied that defendant provided him with alcohol (R. 
150-51, 176, 183-84). 
Detective Miner immediately terminated the meeting, 
took D.A. and D.A.'s mother to his office, and asked D.A. 
why he had changed his story (R. 177, 185-86). D.A. then 
admitted that defendant had persuaded him to deny that 
defendant had provided alcohol to him (R. 133, 178). 
Prior to the trial in this case, defendant filed a pro 
se motion to remove Mr. Caine from the case, contending that 
Mr. Caine needed to testify about D.A.'s statements and 
demeanor at the oral recantation, D.A.'s physical condition 
at the preliminary hearing, and D.A.'s demeanor at other 
times he changed his testimony (R. 11-15). After a hearing, 
the trial court granted defendant's motion and appointed 
another attorney to represent him (R. 246-48).x 
defendant represents that the trial court *found as a 
matter of fact, that there was a conflict because Mr. Caine was a 
potential defense witness." Appellant's Brief at 9. Defendant 
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Mr. Caine then appeared with defendant at defendant's 
arraignment (R. 250). Defendant told the trial court that 
the parties had resolved the issue about Mr. Caine 
testifying by use of a stipulation that D.A. made a 
statement recanting his prior accusation that defendant 
provided D.A. with alcohol (R. 251). The trial court then 
asked defendant if he was comfortable with Mr. Caine 
representing him; defendant stated that he was (id.). When 
the trial court asked defendant whether he believed any 
conflict no longer existed, defendant responded that Mr. 
Caine had informed him that the parties would enter into 
stipulations (id.). Defendant never again suggested that 
Mr. Caine should withdraw to testify until after the jury 
convicted him and he filed his appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not established that his trial counsel: 
1) actively represented an interest in conflict with his 
own; 2) that any conflict adversely affected his counsel's 
includes no record citation to support this representation, and 
the State located no such finding by the trial court. 
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performance; or 3) that he lacked sufficient information to 
make a knowing waiver of any conflict. Each failure 
independently defeats defendant's appellate claims. 
Defendant has not identified what conflicting interest 
his counsel actively represented. Instead, he contends only 
that trial counsel became a necessary witness and should 
therefore have withdrawn to testify on defendant's behalf. 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, even if trial 
counsel became a necessary witness, his decision not to 
testify may establish, at most, a poor strategic decision 
unless defendant establishes that counsel made the decision 
to promote a personal interest over defendant's interests. 
The record contains no evidence of a personal interest. 
Second, defendant has not established that his trial 
counsel was a necessary or even a desirable witness. All of 
the testimony defendant contends his counsel could have 
offered concerned matters that the State did not dispute, 
about which his counsel had no knowledge, or on which his 
counsel could have offered no crucial testimony. Similarly, 
the record contains no evidence of the testimony trial 
6 
counsel would have given; his testimony may have actually 
helped the State's case. Therefore, this record fails to 
establish that trial counsel was a necessary witness. 
Defendant also has not established any adverse affect 
on counsel's performance. To the contrary, the record 
demonstrates that counsel's decision not to withdraw and 
testify resulted from legitimate strategic decisions. 
Finally, the record demonstrates that defendant had 
sufficient information to make a knowing waiver of any 
conflict. In a pre-trial pro se motion, defendant 
successfully had his trial counsel removed and new counsel 
appointed so that his trial counsel could testify. 
Defendant later agreed that his need for trial counsel's 
testimony could be met by other means and agreed to trial 
counsel's continued representation. Defendant's pro se 
motion and discussion with the Court when trial counsel 
resumed the representation demonstrated that he had 
sufficient information to waive his right to conflict-free 
counsel. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS SHOWN NEITHER THAT HIS COUNSEL 
ACTIVELY REPRESENTED CONFLICTING INTERESTS, NOR 
THAT ANY CONFLICT ADVERSELY AFFECTED HIS COUNSEL'S 
PERFORMANCE; ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY 
CONFLICT 
Defendant contends that he was denied his Sixth 
Amendment right to conflict-free counsel because his trial 
counsel, Mr. John Caine, was a necessary witness. 
Appellant's Brief at 11-13. Defendant also admits that he 
waived the conflict, but contests the validity of that 
waiver. Appellant's Brief at 9-11. 
In order to establish a denial of his right to 
conflict-free counsel, defendant must establish both of the 
following: 1) that Mr. Caine actively represented 
conflicting interests; and 2) that the conflict adversely 
affected Mr. Caine's performance. See, e.g.. Gardner v. 
Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 620 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, lie 
S.Ct. 97 (1995); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah 1990). 
If defendant can establish both elements, he need not show 
that counsel's performance undermines confidence in the 
outcome. Id. However, defendant must "point to specific 
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instances in the record to suggest an actual conflict or 
impairment of his or her interests. . . . There is no 
violation where the conflict is irrelevant or merely 
hypothetical . . . ." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d at 75. 
A defendant can waive his right to conflict-free 
counsel. State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484, 490 (Utah App. 
1991). The waiver's validity turns on whether defendant had 
enough infonnation about the possible consequences of the 
waiver. Id. at 490-91. 
Defendant has not established: 1) that Mr. Caine 
actively represented conflicting interests; 2) that any 
conflict adversely affected Mr. Caine's performance; or 3) 
that defendant lacked sufficient information about the 
consequences of waiving any conflict to make a valid waiver. 
Any one of these failures independently defeats his 
appellate claim. 
A. Defendant has not shown what conflicting interest 
Mr. Caine represented. 
Defendant assumes that Mr. Caine had a conflict of 
interest because he became a ^necessary witness." 
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Appellant's Brief at 11-12. For support, defendant cites 
the ethical rule prohibiting counsel from appearing as an 
advocate in a trial where he "is likely to be a necessary 
witness.'' Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7. Defendant 
correctly acknowledges that violating an ethical rule does 
not necessarily establish counsel's ineffectiveness. 
Appellant's Brief at 12. See id. at 489 (the Court may use 
the rules to examine counsel's conduct, but a violation does 
not create a presumption of a breach of a legal duty). 
Nevertheless, defendant relies solely on a purported 
violation of rule 3.7 to support his claim the Mr. Caine had 
an actual conflict of interest. 
Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. First, 
even if Mr. Caine had been a necessary witness, and 
therefore should have withdrawn under rule 3.7, his failure 
to do so does not, by itself, establish a conflict that 
renders counsel's performance ineffective for Sixth 
Amendment purposes. 
Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free 
counsel guarantees him counsel who will pursue his interests 
10 
over those of anyone else. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335, 349-51 (1980) (giving an example of counsel 
representing multiple client's and promoting one client's 
interests to the detriment of the other's interests). This 
Court has recognized that a conflict violating defendant's 
right to conflict-free counsel may arise where counsel 
represents multiple defendants with conflicting interests, 
or where counsel's personal interests conflict with 
defendant's. See. State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d at 488-90. In 
Johnson. for example, this Court found that counsel's 
interest in exonerating himself from the same crime with 
which the State had charged his client conflicted with 
defending his client. Id. at 490. 
Defendant has not shown, and on this record cannot 
show, that Mr. Caine served a conflicting interest of his 
own or of another client's by not testifying. Defendant may 
have shown such a conflict if, for example, the Weber County 
Public Defender's Association paid Mr. Caine on a per case 
basis. A conflict may then exist because Mr. Caine may 
refuse to withdraw and testify in order to further his 
11 
personal pecuniary interests. However, if the association 
pays Mr. Caine a flat fee regardless of the number of 
defendants he represents, he would have no personal interest 
in refusing to withdraw. If counsel's decision not to 
testify did not result from a personal interest in conflict 
with defendant's, that decision may, at most, establish a 
questionable strategic decision, but not that he served 
conflicting interests. 
Second, and more importantly, the record does not 
support defendant's underlying factual premise: this record 
does not establish that Mr. Caine was a necessary or even a 
desirable witness for defendant. In Gardner v. Holden. the 
Utah Supreme Court considered when a lawyer "ought to be 
called as a witness" under the predecessor to rule 3.7. 
Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d at 621. In that case, Gardner's 
attorneys could have added nothing to support Mr. Gardner's 
defense; therefore, the court concluded that *[a]1though 
[Gardner's attorneys] were 'potential' witnesses, they were 
not material witnesses, and nothing in the record indicates 
that they ought to have been called as witnesses." Id. 
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(emphasis in original). 
Gardner controls this case. Defendant contends that 
Mr. Caine would have testified: 1) that D.A. recanted his 
statement accusing defendant of providing D.A. with alcohol; 
2) that defendant was not present when D.A. recanted; 3) 
what D.A.'s demeanor was at the time he recanted; and 4) 
that D.A. was evasive at the preliminary hearing. 
Appellant's Brief at 11-12. The State did not dispute that 
D.A. recanted his earlier statement: that recantation formed 
the basis for the witness-tampering charge. Moreover, other 
witnesses, including D.A.# testified that D.A. had recanted 
his accusation that defendant provided him with alcohol (R. 
121, 127-30, 133, 149, 174-77). 
Mr. Caine could not have testified that defendant was 
absent when D.A. first recanted because he first recanted in 
a written statement typed by the Weber County Defender's 
Association's secretary outside of Mr. Caine's presence (R. 
213). Moreover, the evidence clearly established that 
defendant was not present when D.A. orally recanted on the 
morning of trial, and the State did not contend otherwise. 
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Other witnesses identified who attended the meeting where 
D.A. made his oral recantation; none stated that defendant 
was present (R. 150, 176). 
Defendant's theory also rendered Mr. Caine's testimony 
about D.A.'s demeanor on any given occasion irrelevant. 
Defendant did not contend that D.A. told the truth when he 
gave his single recantation and lied on the multiple 
occasions he accused defendant of providing him with 
alcohol. Mr. Caine focused on the number of different 
stories D.A. gave, pointed out that there was no dispute 
that D.A. had lied, and reminded the jury that D.A. had 
changed his story yet again while testifying at the trial 
(R. 220-24). Mr. Caine then contended that, because it was 
impossible to tell when D.A. told the truth and because D.A. 
provided the only direct witness-tampering evidence, the 
State had not met its burden to prove guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt (R. 221, 224-25). Testimony about D.A.'s 
demeanor while giving one version of the events had no 
relevance to this theory. Because that line of defense 
rendered evidence of defendant's demeanor irrelevant, Mr. 
14 
Caine was not a necessary witness. 
Alternatively, defendant has not established on this 
record that Mr. Caine had crucial testimony to give 
concerning D.A.'s demeanor. To the contrary, the record 
contains no evidence of what Mr. Caine would have stated 
about D.A.'s demeanor. Mr. Caine may have considered D.A.'s 
demeanor evasive when he orally recanted. That testimony 
would have bolstered the State's claim that defendant 
induced D.A. to lie for him. Similarly, he may have 
considered D.A. evasive both at the oral recantation and at 
the preliminary hearing, which would have offered no help in 
determining on which occasion D.A. told the truth. See 
Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d at 621 (defendant not harmed by 
counsel's decision not to testify where counsel's testimony 
would not have advanced his defense). 
Because the existing record contains no evidence of a 
conflicting interest that Mr. Caine may have served by not 
testifying and demonstrates that Mr. Caine was not a 
necessary witness, defendant has established an actual 
conflict of interest between Mr. Caine and himself. 
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B. The record precludes concluding that anv conflict 
adversely affected Mr. Caine's performance. 
In addition to establishing that an actual conflict 
existed, defendant must also establish that the conflict 
adversely affected his counsel's performance, gtate v. 
Webb. 790 P.2d at 76. Although not entirely clear, 
defendant presumably contends that Mr. Caine's decision not 
to testify is the adverse effect. 
In order to determine whether Mr. Caine's decision 
adversely affected defendant, this Court considers whether 
other counsel would have chosen to testify, and whether a 
tactical reason exists for the decision. Id. This record 
affirmatively establishes that Mr. Caine's decision arose 
from legitimate strategic choices. 
As established in the preceding argument, many of the 
facts about which defendant claims Mr. Caine could testify 
were undisputed, were established by other witnesses, or 
were outside of Mr. Caine's knowledge. Therefore, Mr. Caine 
legitimately chose not to testify about those facts. See 
Gardner v. Holden. 888 P.2d at 621 (Gardner not harmed by 
16 
counsel's decision not to testify because counsel could 
offer no helpful testimony). 
Also as established in the preceding argument, 
defendant's theory made any defense testimony about D.A.'s 
demeanor on any given occasion irrelevant. Given the number 
of different stories D.A. told, this theory was the best 
that defendant could offer the jury: it was more plausible 
then attempting to establish that D.A. told the truth only 
in his single recantation. Therefore, Mr. Caine's decision 
to follow it was not only a legitimate tactical decision, 
but the best tactical decision he could have made. See 
State v. Webb. 790 P.2d at 76-77 (finding no adverse affect 
from multiple representation where decision to present a 
unified defense was not only legitimate, but the only 
reasonable defense available). 
Alternatively, the record does not establish that 
defense counsel could have offered any testimony helpful to 
defendant. Therefore, this record does not support 
defendant's argument that Mr. Caine should have withdrawn in 
order to testify about D.A.'s demeanor. 
17 
Because the record establishes that Mr. Caine's 
decisions were legitimate strategic decisions, defendant has 
shown no adverse affect on Mr. Caine's performance. State 
v. Webb, 790 P.2d at 76-77. That failure independently 
defeats his claim that he was denied his right to conflict-
free counsel.2 
C. Defendant had sufficient information to waive his 
right to conflict-free counsel. 
Although he acknowledges that he waived any conflict, 
defendant challenges the waiver's validity because: 1) the 
trial court did not go into sufficient detail about the 
consequences of the waiver; and 2) he did not consult with 
independent counsel before waiving the conflict. 
Appellant's Brief at 10-11. 
A defendant can waive his right to conflict-free 
2Without establishing an actual conflict that adversely 
affected his counsel's performance, defendant can succeed on his 
ineffectiveness claim only by identifying specific acts or 
omissions that fall below objective reasonability and that those 
acts or omissions undermine confidence in the outcome. 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690, 694 (1984); 
Parsons V, Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521-22 (Utah), cert, denied. 115 
S.Ct. 431 (1994). For the reasons just argued, counsel's 
decision not to testify constituted a legitimate strategic 
decision. Defendant has not even argued that counsel's 
performance undermines confidence in the outcome. 
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counsel if he has enough information about the possible 
consequences of the waiver. State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d at 
490-91. 
The record clearly establishes that defendant knew the 
rights he waived. In his pro se motion, defendant 
articulated for the trial court the testimony he sought from 
Mr. Caine, then agreed that a stipulation that D.A. changed 
his story satisfied his interests in having Mr. Caine 
testify (R. 11-15, 246-48, 250-52). Therefore, defendant's 
own motion establishes that he had sufficient information to 
make a valid waiver. 
Defendant contends that wthe trial court did not go 
into any detail to advise [defendant] of the consequences he 
would suffer by waiving his right to conflict free counsel." 
Appellant's Brief at 10-11. Johnson does state that the 
trial court must give w%an adequate warning of the potential 
hazards posed by the conflict of interest and of the 
accused's right to other counsel.'" State v. Johnson. 823 
P.2d at 491 (citation omitted). In this case, defendant 
clearly new the hazards posed by the waiver: if Mr. Caine 
19 
continued to represent him, Mr. Caine could not testify. 
Before waiving his rights, defendant successfully moved to 
remove Mr. Caine for this reason. Similarly, defendant 
clearly knew that he had a right to another attorney: he 
succeeded in obtaining another attorney before changing his 
mind and requesting that Mr. Caine resume representing him. 
Because defendant demonstrated to the trial court that he 
knew the rights he was waiving, no additional warning by or 
inquiry from the trial court was necessary. 
Finally, defendant contends that he could not validly 
waive the conflict without first consulting with independent 
counsel. Defendant cites no case authority to support his 
contention; that failure alone precludes considering it on 
the merits. See, eT&t/ State Vt Amicone, 689 p.2d 1341, 
1344 (Utah 1984)(refusing to consider a issue that Amicone 
supported with no legal authority or analysis). Moreover, 
other jurisdictions have refused to make consultation with 
independent counsel about a possible conflict an absolute 
prerequisite to making a valid waiver. See, e.g.. United 
States v. Rodriguez. 968 F.2d 130, 139 (2nd Cir.) (although 
20 
consultation with independent counsel may be preferable, 
absence of such consultation does not invalidate waiver if 
there is no sign that defendant did not understand what he 
was doing), cert, denied. 506 U.S. 847, 113 S. Ct. 140, 506 
U.S. 1023 (1992); State v. Keezer. 918 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 1996) (declining to mandate use of independent 
counsel); State v. Williams. 523 A.2d 1284, 1293 (Conn. 
1987) (trial court's failure to point out option of 
consulting with independent counsel did not invalidate 
waiver under circumstances of that case). Finally, as noted 
above, defendant clearly understood the scope of the rights 
he waived; therefore, independent counsel's advice about the 
waiver would have proven a superfluous step. 
This Court recognized in Johnson the potential for a 
defendant to manipulate a waiver to his advantage. State v. 
Johnson. 888 P.2d at 491. Defendant attempts to do just 
that. Defendant knew his rights and waived them. He did 
not again suggest during trial that Mr. Caine should 
withdraw so that Mr. Caine could testify, waiting to re-
raise that argument only after the jury convicted him and he 
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filed his appeal. Defendant successfully had Mr. Caine 
removed, then agreed to allow Mr. Caine to represent him; he 
did not change this position until after he lost. 
Therefore, defendant is attempting to manipulate the waiver 
to obtain a second trial. The Court should unot condone 
such manipulation." Id. 
In sum, defendant has not established that Mr. Caine 
actively represented an interest that conflicted with his 
own. Furthermore, the record affirmatively establishes that 
Mr. Caine's decision not to testify arose from legitimate 
strategic concerns; therefore, the record establishes that, 
if a conflicting interest existed, it did not adversely 
affect Mr. Caine's performance. Finally, defendant had 
sufficient information to waive his rights to conflict free 
counsel. Any one of the above defeats defendant's appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State asks the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument to answer any 
22 
questions or concerns the Court may have. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ZL ' day of August 
/11C 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
__y f^cn-^^ea4 tS-^-crT-^^l 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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postage pre-paid, to the following on this Z(Q day of August 
miL 
Kent E. Snider 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ADDENDUM 
OFFENSES AGAINST ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT 76-8-510 
76-8-609. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal pro-
ceeding. 
(1) A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if by the use offeree or 
by any threat which would constitute a means of committing the crime of theft 
by extortion under this code, if the threat were employed to obtain property, or 
by promise of any reward or pecuniary benefits, he attempts to induce an 
alleged .victim of a crime to secure the dismissal of or to prevent the filing of a 
criminal complaint, indictment, or information. 
(2) •Victim," as used in this section, includes a child or other person under 
the care or custody of a parent or guardian. 
History: C. 1958,76-8-509, enacted by L. bribery, to prevent criminal prosecution, | 76-
1973, ch. 196, t 76-8-509. S408. 
Croee-Referencee. — Accepting bribe, or 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jor. 3d. — 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, AJL1L~ Criminal liability of corporation for 
Blackmail, and Threat* { 50. extortion, false pretenaee, or timilar offense, 49 
CJS. — 86 CJJS. Threats and Unlawful A.L.R3d 820. 
Communications { 4. Key Numbers. — Threats •» 1(1). 
76-8-510. Tampering with evidence. 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose to 
impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he knows to be false with 
a purpose to deceive a public servant who is or may be engaged in a 
proceeding or investigation. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-510, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 196,1 76*510 . 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS evidence of guilt was so slight, so conflicting, 
. . . . and so inherently improbable that reasonable 
Knaenee. ^ ^ ^ ^ 4
 n o t ^ yt concluded that defendant 
—AdxmsaibUity. rejected a fire investigation report in an at-
" " S 2 ^ a 4 t e mP t to •**«• destroy, conceal or remove it to 
—Sufficient impair its verity or availability, rather than 
Evident*. rejecting it because it was a "bad report" State 
v. Herman, 767 P.2d 567 (Utah Ct App. 19S9). 
—Admissibility. 
Defendant's swallowing a bag that the police — * " S l e t a n ! '
 A , . _ , _ * , 
had taken into custody impaired the availabil- Evidence that a police officer had intention-
ityofthat evidence for any resulting proceeding • ^ manipulated a breathalyzer machine in 
or investigation irrespective of its admissibility « * * . * o b u i n * « • • Jading was sufficient to 
against defendant at trial. State v. Wagstaff; sojtam a eounehai for tampenng-with^evi-
646 R2d 1311 (Utah Ct App. 1993). d e n o e - S u t * * ^ ^ 7 0 1 R 2 d 4 9 6 (Vtah 1986>-
Evidence was sufficient for jury to conclude 
—Insufficient. that defendant knowingly or intentionally at-
Defendant's conviction of attempted tamper tempted to induce a fire marshal to withhold a 
ing with evidence was reversed, because the report on a fire from an official investigation or 
807 
1153 KULES OF PE0FE8SI0NAL CONDUCT RuleS.7 
COMMENT 
It if difficult to atrika a balanoa batwaan pro-
dding tha right to a frir trial and seJeguard-
fc|(1w • Ijjlil lirfm iijiiaaiiliMi riaaanlim Ilia 
tight to a fur trial neoaeaarily ontailf acme 
CBrtaihnent of tha information that may ba die-
fminatad about a party prior to trial, partial* 
fcrfy whara trial by Jury k involved. If thara 
vera ao such iimita, tha raauh would ba tha 
practical nullification of tha protective eflect of 
tbi rales of forensic daconnn and tha a d o * 
#onary rolaa of evidence. On tha other hand, 
thara are vital aodal intaraata aanrad by the 
ftee diaeenxination of information about events 
taring legal eonaaqoanoai and about legal pro-
seartinp themsshrea The jmhTir hai a tight In 
know about thraate to ita eafety and tnaaanrae 
timed at aaearing to security. It aleo haa a 
legitimate interest fa the conduct af judicial 
prooeedinga, particularly in matters of general 
public concern. Furthermore, the subject mat-
ter of legal proceeding! ia often of direct eignif-
leance in debate and deliberation ever ques-
tkme of public policy. 
-No body of rake can efinnhaneonely satisfy 
all fataraata of fcir trial and all thcae of xrae 
«xpreesioxL The formula in this Bole ia baaed 
upon the Code of Prcrfaeaional Booponsibilifr 
and the ABA Standards Relating to Pair Trial 
and Free Preea, as amended in 1078. 
special mice of confidentiality may validly 
gorero prooeedinga in juvenile, domestic rela-
tione and mental disability prooeedinga, and 
parbape other typee of litigation Sola &4(e) 
raquirae compliance with such Sake. 
CODE COMPARISON 
Bole 8.6 ie aimilar to DB 7*107, except aa 
fellows: First, Role 8.6 adopts the general cri-
teria of •Substantial likelihood of materially 
InfliiTwtwy as adjudicative proceeding" to de-
scribe Impermissible eonduct Second, Rule 8.6 
fcansfbrms the particolare in DB 7*107 into an 
Illustrative compilation that ghrae mir notice 
ef conduct ordinarily posing unacceptable dan-
ger! to the fair administration of justice. 
Knaify, Rule &6 omita DB 7*107(0(7), which 
proridad that a lawyer may vrreal •WJt the 
time of oeisure, a deecription of the phyaical 
evidence oeised, other than a confe—Ion, ad-
miaaion or statement* Such rarelatione may 
ba aubatantially prejudicial and are frequently 
the subject of pretrial suppression motions, 
which, if successful, may be circumvented by 
ptar disclosure to the 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
AKALTBD 
Frotecbvo order. 
—Releaae o/doeumanta. 
Protective order. 
—Releaae ef doeumanta. 
The defendant*a contention that releaae of 
certain doeumanta from the tarma of a protec-
tive order necoeesrify would raauh in an unfair 
trial, In violation of this rule's alleged public 
policy againat pre-trial publicity, wai reacted. 
The Utah Bulee of Profeeaional Conduct gov-
arn the professional and ethical conduct of law-
yere, not what constitutes good oauee for indu-
aion or releaae of documents within a protec-
tive order. Orundberg • . Upjohn Co., 187 
F.RD. 872 CD. Utah 1991). 
Eule 3.7. Lawyer as Witness. 
(a) A lawyer shall not met aa advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is 
likely to be a necessary witneaa except where: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services 
rendered in the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on 
the client. 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in the trial in which another lawyer in 
the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded fitpn 
doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule IS. 
COMMENT 
Combining the rolee of advocate and witneea 
can prejudice the opposing party and can in-
voire a conflict of interest between the lawyer 
and client 
The opposing party fcaa proper ejection 
where the combination of rolee may prejudice 
Oat party's right* in the litigation. A witneea 
is required to testify on the oasis of peraonal 
knowledge, while an advocate ia expected to 
explain and comment on evidence given by 
other*. It may not be clear whether a state-
ment by an advocate-witness ahonld ba taken 
aa proof or as an analysis of the proof 
Paragraph (aXl) recognizee that if the teeti-
mony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in 
-the dual role are purely theoretical. Paragraph 
<aX2) recognizee that where the testimony con* 
jcerai the extent and value of legal eervieee 
rendered in the action in which the testimony 
Ie offered, permitting the lawyer to testify 
avoids the need for a aecond trial with new 
counael to reeohre that iasue1. Moreover, in such 
ffaile£.8 C)ODPOF#UDIGIALADMrNISTEATION VM 
aito«tioii,ti^jTidfthMftpfthandknawkdgt 
af tht matter in tea*; hence, there ii let* de-
pendence an tilt ailvtiauy prooeot to tost tfat 
oa edibility of tht ttsHiiiflny. 
•Apart from thcee two axceptians, paragraph 
<aXS) leeogzriset that a haltnring it laqohad 
between tfat interests af the diant and thoae of 
Ifat apposing party. Whether the appoaing 
party it likely to suffer prejudice depeadj on 
41M nature of tht oate, tilt tmportafmo and 
frohtble ttnor af tht lawyer's ttttimony, and 
tilt probability that tht lawyer's ttttimony 
ariB conflict with that of ether aUuostM Ertn 
if thart it ritk of aoeh prejudice, 4a determin-
ing whtthtr tilt lawyar thouH be ditquslifitd, 
this ragani mutt be given to tht effect of dit-
jqnjdificttion on tht lawyer's diant It it rtle-
itant that one or both partita could rtatonably 
i that tht lawyar would probtbly bt a 
Tht principle of imputed ditqaihfiet. 
Hon atattd in Bale UO hat no fTa*'Ttinn ID 
thit atptet af the problem, 
Whether tht ownhinttinn of role* tunkm 
an improper conflict of inttratt with respect t» 
the client it determined by Bole L7 or U. Par 
asarnple, if there it likely to be -tomtit] 
conflict between tht testimony of tht cheat tad 
that of tilt lawyar or a number of the lawjw/i 
tenths lofffoatntetinn It improper. Tht ptob» 
Jam oan ariat whtthtr tht lawyar it culled ti t 
witness on behalf of tht client or it called by 
tht canting forty. Determining whtthtr tr 
act ouch a conflict exist* it primarily the ie. 
•epmMfbflity of tfat lawyar tnrohrod. Bet Com-
m a t to Bole 1.7. If a lawyar who it a member 
af a firm may not act at both advocate aal 
wftnsai by reaton of conflict of interact, Bolt 
1.10 ditqnaliflet tht firm alto. 
CODE COMPARISON 
WL M02CA) prohibited a lawyar, or the law-
part fan, from tarring at advocate if tht law-
yer learned or it it obvious that he or a lawyar 
in hit firm ought to bt called at a witnttj on 
behalf of hi* diant" DR 6402(B) provided that 
a lawyar, and tht lawyart firm, may continue 
trapraatntation if tht lawyer leant or it it ob-
vious that ht or a lawyar in fait firm may bt 
called at a witntat other than on behalf of his 
client.. • tmta it it apparent that his testimony 
It or may bt prejudicial to hie diant" DR 
M01CB) permitted a lawyar to testify while 
rtjii ttiiiti \\g a client: t l ) If tht testimony will 
folate solely to an uncontested matter, (2) If 
tilt testimony will relate solely to a matter of 
formality and there it no reason to believe thst 
substantial evidence wQl be offered in opposi-
tion to tht testimony, (8) If the testimony wffl 
folate solely to tht nature and value of legal 
services rendered in the east hy tht lawyer or 
his firm to tht diant; (4) As to any matter If 
refusal would work a substantial hardship on 
tilt client because of the distinctive value of 
the lawyar ar hit firm as counsel in the partio-
alar cast." 
3he exception stated in paragraph (aXl) con-
solidates provisions of DR 6-101CBXD and QD. 
Tsstixnony relating to formality, referred to m 
DR M01CBX2), in effect defined the pares* 
•uncontested issue," and was redundant 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
riead avast bt compelling' 
It is generally inadvisable fa a member af 
the bar to testify in litigation in which he or 
ahe personally represents a party. The need far 
the ttttimony of counsel must be ^ impelling 
and must be necessary to preserve the cause of 
action. Watidss k Campbell v. Foa * Son, 806 
F.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
Lawyar tsproocTiting himself 
Need must be onmpelUng. 
Lawyar representing himself. 
Tht prohibition of thit rule against an advo-
atte testifying as a witness does not apply to an 
attorney representing himself as a litigant in a 
cast. Beckftead v. Dessist Roofing Co., 831 
P Jd ISO (Utah Ct 4pp. 1992). 
Rule 3*8. Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor. 
The proaecutor in a criminal ease shall: 
(a) Refrain from prosecuting a charge that the proaecutor knows is not 
•imported by probable cause; 
(b) Make reasonable efforts to aaaure that the accused has been advised 
of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been 
given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel; 
(c) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of im-
portant pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing; 
(d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information 
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the 
defense all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, 
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility py a protec-
tive order of the tribunal; and 
(e) Exercise reasonable care to prevent Investigators, law enforcement 
personnel/employees or other j>ersons'assisting or associated with the 
